How was the power infrastructure in the earthquake-stricken areas of Myanmar damaged?

How was the power infrastructure in the earthquake-stricken areas of Myanmar damaged? The power infrastructure in the earthquake-stricken areas of Myanmar suffered systematic damage in the strong magnitude 7.9 earthquake. The core damage situation can be summarized into three major characteristics: **power grid paralysis, facility damage, and restoration obstruction**, with the specific manifestations as follows:

# I. Total Collapse of the Power Grid System

1. **Paralysis of the National Power Grid**

The earthquake caused the main grid framework of Myanmar's national power grid to break, resulting in **a power outage across the country**. Core areas such as Naypyidaw, the capital, and Mandalay, the second largest city, experienced a complete power outage, with an average daily power outage of over 15 hours. The transmission network at the junction of Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region was almost completely destroyed, and a large number of high-voltage transmission towers along the Irrawaddy River collapsed, causing **a large-scale interruption of the 10kV to 230kV transmission lines**.

2. **Severe Damage to Substations**

   - **Damage to Main Substation Equipment**: The main structure of the substation near the Sagaing Bridge in Mandalay broke. The main transformer and switching equipment shifted due to the intense vibration of the earthquake, and short-circuit faults led to the burning of the equipment.

   - **Damage to Rural Power Distribution Facilities**: Due to insufficient seismic design, the rural substations in Mandalay Region, Sagaing Region and other places had cracked walls and collapsed roofs. Some equipment was buried and crushed, and **60% of the rural power distribution lines could not operate normally**.

3. **Obstruction of Power Station Operation**

   - **Hydropower Stations**: Main hydropower facilities such as the Yeywa Hydropower Station and the Bhamo Hydropower Station could not supply power outward due to the interruption of the transmission lines. Some of the dams and diversion canals of these power stations had cracks and required urgent maintenance.

   - **Thermal Power Stations**: The gas-fired power stations near Yangon were forced to shut down due to the interruption of fuel transportation and power grid failures, exacerbating the power shortage.

   - **Photovoltaic Power Stations**: Large-scale projects such as the Jingrong Photovoltaic Power Station in Mandalay Region did not suffer structural damage, but were shut down for a while due to power grid failures. The distributed photovoltaic systems (such as residential solar energy) in rural areas were **extensively damaged** due to roof collapses, further weakening the off-grid power supply capacity.

 II. Damage to Key Facilities and the Impact of Secondary Disasters

1. **Damage to the Transmission Network**

   - **Interruption of Main Trunk Lines**: The 230kV double-circuit transmission line connecting Naypyidaw and Mandalay broke due to the earthquake. The repair work was delayed due to aftershocks and road damage, resulting in a complete interruption of power transmission between the two major cities.

   - **Damage to Distribution Lines**: The distribution cables in downtown Mandalay were crushed due to building collapses. In some areas, fires were caused by short circuits, increasing the difficulty of rescue operations.

2. **Failure of the Emergency Power Supply System**

   - **Failure of Backup Generators**: The diesel generators in key places such as hospitals and government agencies could not be started due to fuel shortages or equipment damage. The Mandalay City Hospital was forced to suspend surgeries due to the power outage, and power-dependent medical equipment (such as ventilators) could not be used.

   - **Paralysis of Communication Base Stations**: The power outage caused the communication base stations to be inoperable. The **mobile phone signals completely disappeared** in places like Mandalay and Naypyidaw, hindering rescue coordination and the reporting of the disaster situation.

3. **Increased Damage Caused by Secondary Disasters**

   - **Impact of Aftershocks**: There were 25 aftershocks (with a maximum magnitude of 7.5) within 48 hours after the earthquake, causing the already damaged transmission towers to collapse further, and the repair work was forced to be interrupted.

   - **Landslides**: Landslides in the mountainous areas of Sagaing Region buried some of the transmission lines. The repair work needs to wait for the geological conditions to stabilize, prolonging the restoration period.

 III. Restoration Progress and Challenges

1. **Deployment of Emergency Power Supply**

   - **International Aid**: The emergency aid of 100 million yuan provided by the Chinese government includes **mobile substations and diesel generators**. Temporary power supply systems have been set up in places like Mandalay and Naypyidaw, giving priority to ensuring the power supply for hospitals and temporary resettlement sites.

   - **Contributions of Chinese Enterprises**: The Jingrong Photovoltaic Power Station of Power China resumed power supply within 48 hours after the earthquake. The first-level hydropower station on the Ruili River of Huaneng resumed power supply to northern Myanmar through the 230kV line, providing stable power for earthquake relief.

2. **Difficulties in Long-term Repair**

   - **Shortage of Equipment**: Myanmar lacks key equipment such as high-voltage transmission towers and transformers domestically and needs to import them from countries like China and India. The transportation is hindered due to road damage.

   - **Insufficient Technical Manpower**: The power department can only mobilize 30% of the technical personnel to participate in the emergency repair, and they lack experience in repairing seismic-resistant power facilities, so they need to rely on international technical support.

   - **Funding Gap**: The United States Geological Survey estimates that the economic loss caused by the earthquake accounts for 70% of Myanmar's GDP. There is a serious shortage of funds for power repair, and institutions such as the Asian Development Bank are evaluating loan plans.

 IV. Power Dilemma in Rural Areas

1. **Weak Infrastructure**

The power coverage rate in rural areas of Myanmar is only 34%. Before the earthquake, it already relied on diesel generators and distributed photovoltaics. After the earthquake, **80% of the rural areas experienced a complete power outage**, and they could not obtain emergency power supply equipment due to road interruptions.

2. **Damage to Microgrids**

The off-grid microgrids (such as photovoltaic + energy storage systems) in places like Kachin State failed due to equipment damage or short circuits in energy storage batteries. 50% of the rural medical stations and schools lost their power supply, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

 V. Future Reconstruction Directions

1. **Upgrading of Seismic-resistant Facilities**

It is planned to raise the seismic standard of substations to level 9, adopt H-shaped steel frames and copper-nickel alloy busbars, and deploy **smart grid equipment** in earthquake-prone areas such as Mandalay and Naypyidaw to support automatic fault isolation and rapid recovery.

2. **Substitution by New Energy**

Accelerate the promotion of photovoltaic and wind power projects. The 1GW photovoltaic base in Meiktila, Mandalay, of Power China has restarted construction. It is expected that after it is put into operation in 2026, it can meet the electricity needs of 1 million households, reducing the dependence on the traditional power grid.

3. **International Cooperation**

China and Myanmar plan to establish a **Joint Working Group for the Reconstruction of Power Infrastructure**. China will provide technical training and equipment support, with the goal of restoring 80% of the power grid coverage by the end of 2025.

 Conclusion

This earthquake has exposed the vulnerability of Myanmar's power infrastructure. The core problems include the insufficient disaster resistance capacity of the power grid, the dependence of rural power supply on traditional energy sources, and the weakness of the emergency response system. In the short term, it is necessary to rely on international aid to restore the main power grid. In the long term, the system's resilience needs to be enhanced through seismic upgrades and new energy transitions. Chinese enterprises have played a key role in the post-disaster recovery, and their technical experience and project cases provide a feasible path for the power reconstruction of Myanmar.